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Examining offending behaviour following receipt of a Business Crime 
Reduction Partnership’s place-based exclusion sanction 
Abstract 
This article examines the post-sanction offending behaviour of individuals who received a 
warning or exclusion from a Business Crime Reduction Partnership (BCRP) in England. 
Noteworthy desistance occurred following the receipt of the warning (76%) and the exclusion 
(37%). Displacement of offending was observed, with most of those who continued to offend 
doing so only at business premises away from where they received their initial sanction. Variation 
in post-sanction offending behaviour was explored according to offender age and sex, offence 
time and whether the offence concerned theft, violence, abuse or alcohol. Higher rates of 
recidivism were observed among male offenders and those committing abuse offences, higher 
rates of displacement among those who committed theft offences, and the most varied and 
unpredictable offending among those that continued to offend post-exclusion. The findings 
presented here highlight the importance of holistic, multi-sector BCRPs that make information 
on offenders easily accessible to their members. 
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Introduction 
Place-based exclusions or bans are a widely used punitive measure. The principle of removing 
from a location an individual who has committed or poses a risk of committing a prohibited act 
underpins a range of legal, civil and privately enforced sanctions. Such sanctions have key 
criminological concepts and principles in common. Firstly, they are underpinned by key three 
criminological theories. Rational choice theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) presents the case that 
a criminal act follows an analysis of effort, risk and reward. Routine activity theory (Cohen and 
Felson, 1979) prescribes that crime occurs where there is a convergence of a suitable target, a 
motivated offender, and the opportunity for a crime due to an absence of a capable guardian. 
Deterrence theory states that it is the perceived likelihood of getting caught that is the most 
significant deterrent from committing a crime (Apel and Nagin, 2011; Apel, 2013). A collectively 
enforced exclusion sanction system is designed to increase a community’s communal vigilance, 
reducing the opportunity for particular acts or behaviours, increasing the risk of being caught, 
and, in turn, deterring individuals from committing such acts. Secondly, their design draws upon 
principles of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1997) and ideas of defensible space (Newman, 
1972), operationalising spatially-targeted powers to control and restrict behaviours and 
movements. Removing an individual from an area where there is potential to commit particular 
prohibited behaviours will harden targets (Tilley, 2002) reduce opportunities (Felson and Clarke, 
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1998) and increase effort and risk while reducing rewards (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). As a result 
of this, and like many contemporary criminal justice strategies, such sanctions are ‘pre-emptive’ 
in nature (Zedner, 2009); based on an assessment of prior behaviour, bans are used as a means 
of social and behavioural control, preventing offenders from committing further undesirable acts 
through an increase in risk and reduction of opportunity.  
Bans of this nature have been used extensively to tackle several specific crimes and associated 
behaviours. A major increase can be observed in the use of legally imposed banning in response 
to alcohol related crime and disorder in the night time economy (Palmer and Warren, 2014). In 
England and Wales, in addition to the range of licensing conditions and enforcement powers 
that individual venues can exercise through the Licencing Act 2003, legal sanctions such as 
Criminal Behaviour Orders, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), Dispersal Orders, Curfew 
Orders and Alcohol Disorder Zones have all been used to remove known offenders from city 
centres or particular residential areas following an incident of illegality or an act of prohibited 
behaviour.  
Bans have also been used in response to retail crime. The British Retail Consortium (BRC) 
estimates the total annual cost of retail crime in Britain to be £900 million (BRC 2019). Retail 
theft by customers was estimated to be over £700 million for financial year 2017-18 (BRC 2019), 
but theft committed by employees is also a problem for the sector (Clarke and Petrossian 2013). 
The prevalence of violence and threats against businesses has been observed to be extensive in 
retail settings (BRC 2019; Harrell 2011; Hopkins and Gill 2017). Such crimes can impact upon 
employee wellbeing as well as have financial consequences for a business (Burrows and Hopkins 
2005). Indeed, the BRC (2019) identified violence, abuse and customer theft as the most 
significant types of crime that businesses can fall victim to as well as the issues that businesses 
most commonly prioritise through their crime reduction efforts.  
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Place-based exclusions are used as criminal or civil punitive measures or issued by private 
organisations in response to these issues. ‘Private public locations’ such as shopping centres, 
airports, schools and universities often have their own security services responsible for issuing 
and enforcing some form of banning order (Schuilenburg, 2015). Shopping centres, in particular, 
have been the foreground for embedded processes of surveillance and exclusion. Social controls 
are used in this setting ‘to exclude those who are considered undesirable’ and to cause visitors to 
surrender certain civil liberties (Miler et al., 1998:105). Schuilenburg (2015:285) labels the 
sanctions used in such environments as ‘selective exclusions’, imposing rules of behaviour for 
those entering these public-private spaces. 
Banning sanctions are also used by crime reduction partnerships and other collectives and 
community groups. Those involved will identify undesirable behaviours and set parameters for 
bans issued to those that commit such acts. Bans that exclude individuals from the premises of 
all those involved in a partnership can be identified as ‘contractual governance’ (Crawford, 2003: 
479), where social obligations materialise themselves as ‘forms of parochial control’. Many of 
these sanctions are civil or non-legal measures separate from criminal penalties and carry 
authority based on ‘the covenant that has been locally agreed between the municipality and the 
participating parties’ (Schuilenburg, 2015:280). Such agreements are often a defining 
characteristic of a pub-watch, shop-watch or broader Business Crime Reduction Partnership 
(BCRP) scheme, where information on offenders is shared between members to ensure that 
exclusions can be enforced across the locations of all involved. BCRPs will commonly bring 
together businesses that share a location, but that are from a wide range of commercial sectors 
and trade in either the day time or night economy hours to collectively enforce a sanction system 
that punishes behaviours such as theft, violence, abuse and alcohol related disorder (Safer 
Business Network 2019). Although BCRP members may be affected by these issues in different 
ways and at different times (see Ceccato and Armitage 2018b), through this partnership model 
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shared is the view that these behaviours need to be tackled and that they are the concern of the 
business community as a collective. 
Despite their widespread use, there is mixed evidence concerning the effectiveness of place-
based bans as a means of crime control. Legally enforced exclusion sanctions such as Football 
Banning Orders used by the police when tackling football related crime and disorder can serve 
the function of controlling certain supporters (Hopkins, 2014) and have been found to be highly 
effective in some circumstances (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2011). In relation to alcohol related 
crime, however, Søgaard (2018) notes that although patron bans are commonly viewed positively 
by authorities, little research exists on the behaviour of patrons post-ban. In their discussion of 
police-imposed area bans in Australia, Farmer et al. (2018: 438) note how parliamentary debates 
typically justify their use and their effectiveness, but that such debates are accompanied by a ‘lack 
of evidence presented to support the underlying assumptions that banning directly improves the 
safety of other patrons’. There is also mixed evidence concerning the extent to which crime is 
displaced by location bans. In relation to alcohol related disorder, for example, Crawford and 
Lister (2007) note that the nature of problem-drinkers can mean that place-based powers are 
likely to displace rather than resolve such issues. At the same time, there is a growing body of 
literature arguing that crime displacement does not often occur (Guerette and Bowers, 2009), is 
not an inevitable outcome of a crime prevention intervention, and that diffusion of crime control 
benefits is at least as likely (Johnson et al., 2014).  
The need for further enquiry in these areas is just one part of a wider dearth in evidence 
concerning the tackling of crime against the commercial sector (Gill, 2018: Hopkins and Gill 
2017). With businesses making extensive use of this approach to crime control particularly in 
relation to theft, violence, abuse and alcohol related crime, there is a need for studies that 
monitor the use of bans, provide meaningful measurement of their effect on the behaviours of 
individuals (Farmer et al., 2018), consider the role and responsibilities of guardians in tackling 
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retail crime and the effect of environmental dynamics on retail crime (Ceccato and Armitage 
2018a) and draw conclusions about the overall effectiveness of place-based exclusions. It is here 
that this article makes its contribution. 
Background and focus of study 
This article seeks to increase understanding of how individuals behave following the receipt of 
place-based bans. By examining levels of desistance and displacement and analysing certain 
characteristics of post-sanction offending, it offers insight into the effectiveness of such 
mechanisms and into the challenges that those using these sanctions can encounter. The article 
presents a detailed examination of a place-based banning sanction used by a BCRP in South 
West England to tackle shoplifting and theft, alcohol related disorder, abuse and violent offences 
and a number of other specific behaviours. In this article, these behaviours (listed at Table A) are 
referred to as ‘offences’, and those who commit them as ‘offenders’ who have breached the 
terms of acceptable behaviour according to the partnership. The BCRP, ‘Gloucester City Safe’, 
launched in 2014, operates as a not-for-profit company in the city of Gloucester and the 
surrounding areas. Its members include retail businesses, restaurants, pubs, bars, nightclubs, 
supermarkets, transport providers, entertainment facilities and other public and private 
organisations (Gloucester City Safe, 2019). Members pay a subscription fee to have access to a 
secure information sharing web platform and radio network and agree to enforce collectively a 
banning policy that sees offending behaviour in or near to one member’s premises punished with 
an exclusion from all member premises.  
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Table A: All categories of offence recorded by the partnership 
Begging Infringement/Breach of ASBO 
Begging persistent Joyriding 
Kerb crawling Misuse of ID 
Noise nuisance Other 
Rough sleeping Possession of offensive weapon 
Street drinking Racial abuse 
Attempted theft Section 35 dispersal issued 
Being on the premises while banned Smoking, underage or in prohibited area 
Criminal damage/Graffiti/Vandalism Underage intoxication 
Possession of drugs Unlicensed street trading 
Possession with intent to supply drugs Unlicensed taxi cab 
Breach of police bail Drunken and disorderly behaviour 
Breach of Section 35 dispersal order Harassment/Threatening behaviour 
Going equipped to steal Verbal abuse 
Hate crime Robbery 
Illegal gambling Theft 
Inappropriate sexual contact Assault/Violence/Affray 
 
The partnership’s sanction system has two tiers. A first offence is met with a warning or ‘yellow 
card’ whereby an offender will be made aware that continued offending (as defined by the 
partnership) will result in a 12-month exclusion from all member premises. A ban, or ‘red card’, 
is issued when an individual that has received a warning continues to offend at any member 
location, or in some instances where multiple offences were committed in quick succession 
without the opportunity for a warning to be issued. Both sanctions apply for a period of 12 
months. Upon receiving a sanction, individuals are issued with a list of businesses to which the 
condition applies. Business involved in the partnership display a sticker at their customer 
entrance to aid with this. After a sanction has been issued, images and personal details of an 
offender are shared among members via email and made available on the web platform to 
facilitate collective enforcement. The BCRP employs a manager, whose responsibilities include 
deciding when to issue the warning sanction, maintaining the information sharing platform, 
administrating memberships and managing procedural aspects of all sanctions. It is the manager 
along with a police officer who will, wherever possible, issue an exclusion sanction to an 
individual in person. The partnership’s governance is the responsibility of a Board of Directors 
and all decisions to issue exclusions are taken by an independent Management Board.  
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Drawing upon four years of data concerning the offences recorded by the partnership and the 
exclusions that were issued, this article seeks to answer the following research questions: (1) Do 
people desist from offending after they are issued with (i) the warning or (ii) the exclusion 
sanction? (2) What can be observed about the offending behaviour of those who continue to 
offend after receiving (i) the warning or (ii) the exclusion sanction in terms of offence type, 
location, and time committed? And (3) can offender/offence information recorded by the 
partnership be used to predict the occurrence of further offending following the receipt of (i) the 
warning or (ii) the exclusion sanction? Under each research question, the behaviour of all 
offenders from the four-year period is considered before variation is explored according to seven 
specific variables: offender age and sex, whether the offence was committed during day time 
economy trading hours (6am – 6pm) or night time economy trading hours (6pm-6am), and 
whether the incident was an alcohol, violent, abuse or theft offence. Difference in behaviour 
according to offender sex and age is explored to determine whether these factors can play a part 
in sanction compliance. The remaining variables were selected to explore whether the 
partnership’s sanction system experiences greater or lesser success when used to tackle offending 
during the day time or night time economy trading periods, and when used to combat these 
specific types of offences.  
Methods 
This research employed a quantitative methodology to examine the partnership’s offence and 
exclusion data. These data comprised 4935 offences committed by 2080 individual offenders at 
115 locations occurring between September 2014 and August 2018. Each offence record 
includes information on the offender, the offence committed (which could have involved 
instances of one or more of the 34 offence categories listed at Table A), the time and location at 
which it occurred and whether a warning or exclusion sanction was issued.  
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The offences committed by sanctioned offenders were coded to facilitate statistical analysis of 
offence type, location and time of day and whether offending ceased, remained the same, or 
changed after an offender was issued with a warning or exclusion sanction. Descriptive statistics 
(expressed as frequencies and percentages) and inferential statistical tests (chi-squared tests, 
independent sample t-tests, and one way ANOVA tests) were used to examine variation in 
offender behaviour within the sample according to the seven variables of interest (offender sex 
and age, whether the offence was committed during day time or night time trading hours, and 
whether the offence concerned theft, alcohol related disorder, abuse or violence). Logistic 
regression was employed to determine whether these same variables can be used to predict the 
occurrence of further offending following receipt of the sanctions.  
Findings 
During the data collection period, 1303 individuals received warnings and 329 received 
exclusions (307 continuing to offend following the receipt of warning and 22 receiving an 
exclusion without prior warning). Of the offenders that received sanctions from the partnership, 
781 (60%) were male and 519 (40%) female with their ages ranging from 10 years to 84 years 
(with a mean age of 30). There were 1362 sanctions issued for offences committed during the 
day time economy trading hours (6am – 6pm) and 290 sanctions issued for offences committed 
during the night time economy trading hours (6pm – 6am). Of these offences that were punished 
with sanction, 75 were alcohol offences (recorded by the partnership as incidents of ‘drunken 
and disorderly behaviour’ or ‘underage intoxication’), 116 were violent offences (recorded by the 
partnership as incidents of ‘Assault/Violence/Affray’), 219 were abuse offences (recorded by the 
partnership as incidents of ‘verbal abuse’ or ‘harassment/threatening behaviour’), and 1251 were 
theft offences (recorded by the partnership as incidents of ‘theft’ or ‘attempted theft’). 
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Q1: Do people desist from offending after they are issued with (i) the warning or (ii) the 
exclusion sanction?  
With such widespread use of place-based banning sanctions, this question was included to 
generate insight into the extent to which such sanctions are adhered to following their receipt. 
Of the 1303 individuals who were issued with warnings, 996 (76%) committed no further 
offences after receiving this sanction. Table B illustrates how similar volumes and percentages of 
offenders who desisted or continued to offend following the receipt of the warning can be 
observed across the offender/offence variables. Chi-squared tests for independence indicated a 
significant association between sex and offending following a warning (p<0.001), with 11% more 
female offenders (83%) desisting following receipt of this sanction than male offenders (72%), 
and between abuse offences and offending following a warning (P=0.041), with the highest rate 
of continued offending post-warning sanction (30%) observed here. Chi-squared tests for 
independence indicated no significant associations between the remaining variables and 
continuing to offend following a warning. The highest rate of desistance following the receipt of 
the warning can be observed among those who committed a violent offence (81%). The 
percentages of offenders that continued to offend following a warning issued during the day time 
or night time trading hours, or for an alcohol or a theft offence were similar to the percentage of 
offenders that continued to offend post-warning within the sample as a whole (24%). 
Descriptive statistics show mean age in years is slightly lower for offenders that desist after a 
warning sanction (28.4) compared to those that ignore their warning and continue to offend 
(31.7). An independent samples t-test indicated a significant association between complying with 
a warning sanction and mean age (t (1117, n=1119)=-3.481, p=0.001). 
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Table B: Desistance from offending following warning sanction 
Variable Sample (n=1303) Activity following warning 
Sub-
sample 
% of total 
sample 
Desist Continue 
offending 
p-value 
Full sample 1303 100 996/76% 307/24%  
Age (mean years) 1119 86 28.4 31.7 0.001 
Sex Male 781 60 565/72% 216/28% 0.000 
Female 519 40 429/83% 90/17% 
Trading hours  Day time economy 1074 82 819/76% 255/24% 0.737 
Night time economy 229 18 177/77% 52/23% 
Alcohol offence Yes 58 4 45/78% 13/22% 0.833 
No 1245 96 951/76% 294/24% 
Violent offence Yes 97 7 79/81% 18/19% 0.227 
No 1206 93 917/76% 289/24% 
Abuse offence Yes 164 13 115/70% 49/30% 0.041 
No 1139 87 881/77% 258/23% 
Theft offence Yes 1011 78 778/77% 223/23% 0.415 
No 292 22 218/75% 74/25% 
 
Desistance rates following exclusion were lower than following the warning sanction. Of the 329 
individuals who continued to offend after receipt of a warning or who were excluded without 
prior warning, 123 (37%) committed no further offences. Table C illustrates the volumes and 
percentages of offenders who desisted or continued to offend following the receipt of the 
exclusion across the offender/offence variables. A chi-squared test for independence indicated a 
significant association between the trading hours during which the offence was committed and 
offending following an exclusion (p=0.035), with 14% more night time economy offenders 
(49%) desisting following receipt of this sanction than day time economy offenders (35%). 
Although chi-squared tests for independence indicated no significant associations between the 
remaining variables and continuing to offend following an exclusion, noteworthy variation 
occurred across the percentages of offenders in these sub-samples. The highest rates of 
desistence within the remaining variables can be observed among those who received an 
exclusion for a violent offence (58%) or an alcohol offence (47%). A higher percentage of female 
offenders (43%) desisted following their exclusion than male offenders (35%). The highest rates 
of continued offending post-exclusion sanction can be observed among those sanctioned for 
abuse offences (71%) and theft offences (64%). Descriptive statistics show mean age in years is 
slightly lower for offenders that desist after an exclusion sanction (30.7) compared to those that 
ignore their exclusion and continue to offend (32.2). However, an independent samples t-test 
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indicated no significant association between complying with a warning sanction and mean age (t 
(287, n=289)=-1.044, p=0.297).    
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Table C: Desistance from offending following exclusion sanction 
Variable Sample (n=329) Activity following exclusion 
Sub-
sample 
% of total 
sample 
Desist Continue 
offending 
p-value 
Full sample 329 100 123/37% 206/63%  
Age (mean years) 289  88 30.7 32.2 0.297 
Sex Male 233 71 82/35% 151/65% 0.177 
Female 95 29 41/43% 54/57% 
Trading hours  Day time economy 288 81 93/35% 175/65% 0.035 
Night time economy 61 19 30/49% 31/51% 
Alcohol offence Yes 17 5 8/47% 9/53% 0.397 
No 312 95 115/37% 197/63% 
Violent offence Yes 19 6 11/58% 8/42% 0.057 
No 310 94 112/36% 198/64% 
Abuse offence Yes 55 17 16/29% 39/71% 0.164 
No 274 83 107/39% 167/61% 
Theft offence Yes 240 73 87/36% 153/64% 0.484 
No 89 27 36/40% 53/60% 
 
Q2: What can be observed about the offending behaviour of those who continue to 
offend after receiving (i) the warning or (ii) the exclusion sanction in terms of offence 
type, location, and time committed?  
Across the four year data collection period, there were 307 individuals who offended again after 
the receipt of a warning and 206 who offended again after the receipt of an exclusion. The 
importance of this research question is twofold; firstly, it is this group of offenders on which the 
sanctions were having little or no effect as a means of crime control, and, secondly, in line with 
other studies (Home Office, 2001, 2003, 2004), it was this small proportion of offenders in the 
sample who were responsible for a disproportionately large percentage of the total offences 
recorded by the partnership. Over the four-year period there were 4935 offences recorded by the 
BCRP committed by 2080 individuals at 115 locations. Although the mean number of offences 
committed by an offender was 2.4 (with the standard deviation at 5.4) the mode and median 
number of offences was one, illustrating the uneven distribution of offending across the offender 
group. The large majority of offenders (1553/2080, 75%) only committed one offence, but the 
highest number of offences committed by a single person was 70. A group of 34 individuals (2% 
of all offenders), each committing 20 or more offences, were responsible for 1254 (25%) of the 
total offences recorded by the partnership.   
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Analysis of the offences committed by those who continued to offend post-sanction provides 
valuable insight into offending activity. For each offender, comparisons were made between the 
offence which resulted in their sanction and their further offences in terms of the offence type 
(from the 34 offence categories), location (from the 115 businesses involved in the partnership), 
and whether the offence occurred during day time economy trading hours (6am-6pm) or night 
time economy trading hours (6pm-6am). For each individual offender, their post-sanction 
offending behaviour was coded according to whether the offence type, location, and time period 
stayed the same as it was for their sanction offence (‘repeated only’), changed and was not 
repeated (‘other only’), or was repeated in some instances but different in others (‘repeated and 
other’). This analysis was conducted both for all those that continued to offend post-warning 
and post-exclusion and also within these two groups against the seven specific offender/offence 
variables (offender age and sex, the trading hours during which the offence was committed, and 
whether the incident was an alcohol, violent, abuse or theft offence). The results for post-
warning offending behaviour are displayed at Table D and for post-exclusion offending 
behaviour at Table E. 
Descriptive statistics show mean age in years for those that continued to offend after receiving a 
warning across the sub-samples ranged from 30.7 to 33.5, not varying hugely from the mean age 
for all offenders that ignore their warning and continue to offend (31.7). One way ANOVA tests 
confirmed that there was not a significant difference in mean offender age for post-warning 
offence type (F(2, n=270)=0.434, p=0.648), offence location (F(2, n=270)=0.227, p=0.797), or 
offence trading hours (F(2, n=270)=0.693, p=0.501). When considering all those that continued 
to offend post-warning, a majority both repeated their offence type and committed other types 
of offences (52%). This behaviour was observed across all of the sub-samples. A chi-squared test 
for independence indicated a significant association (p=0.019) between sex and post-warning 
offence type, with 40% of female offenders only repeating the type of offence for which they 
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received a warning (compared to 24% for male offenders and 29% for the whole sample). Other 
chi-squared tests for independence indicated a significant association (p=0.001) between whether 
or not the offence concerned theft and post-warning offence type, with 33% of offending 
activity following theft offences only involving further theft (‘repeated only’, compared to 16% 
for non-theft offences and 29% for the sample as a whole), and between whether or not the 
offence concerned abuse and post-warning offence type, with just 16% of post-warning 
offending activity following abuse offences only involving further abuse offences. 
For all who continued to offend post-warning, a large majority (70%) would commit further 
offences only at locations other than where they committed the offence that resulted in receiving 
a warning sanction. This volume of premise level displacement was present across all of the sub-
samples. A chi-squared test for independence indicated a significant association (p=0.017) 
between whether or not the offence concerned theft and post-warning offence location, with 
74% of offending activity following theft incidents being carried out at other locations 
(compared to 58% for non-theft offences and 70% for the sample as a whole). 
A majority (60%) of all those who committed post-warning offences did so only within the 
trading time period during which their initial sanction offence was committed. Again, this 
behaviour was observed across all of the sub-samples. A chi-squared test for independence 
indicated a significant association (p=0.003) between the trading hour time period of the 
sanction offence and of the further offending. Of those who received warnings for offences 
committed during the day time economy trading hours, 62% continued to offend only during the 
same trading hours, with the equivalent finding for night time economy offending at 52%. 
Although both are majorities, this still means that 38% of those that received their warning for 
an offence committed during day time trading hours and 48% during night time trading hours 
went on to commit offences during the opposing trading period. Another chi-squared test for 
independence indicated a significant association (p=0.01) between sex and post-warning offence 
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trading hour time period, with 71% of male offenders only committing post-warning offences 
during the trading hours in which their original offence was committed (compared to 55% for 
female offenders and 60% for the whole sample).  
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Table D: Post-warning offender behaviour 
 
Variable 
Sample (n=307) Offence type Offence location Offence trading hours 
Sub-
sample 
% of total 
sample 
Repeated 
only 
Other 
only 
Repeated 
and other 
p-
value 
Repeated 
only 
Other 
only 
Repeated 
and other 
p-
value 
Repeated 
only 
Other 
only 
Repeated 
and other 
p-
value 
Full sample 307 100 88/29% 60/20% 159/52%  37/12% 215/70% 55/18%  184/60% 24/8% 99/32%   
Age (mean years) 270 88 32.0 32.8 31.1 0.648 32.4 31.8 30.7 0.797 31.0 33.5 32.6 0.501 
Sex Male 216 71 52/24% 46/21% 118/55% 0.019 27/13% 144/67% 45/21% 0.081 119/55% 22/10% 75/35% 0.01 
Female 90 29 36/40% 14/16% 40/44% 9/10% 71/79% 10/11% 64/71% 2/2% 24/27% 
Trading hours  Day time economy 255 83 79/31% 45/18% 131/51% 0.06 27/11% 185/73% 43/17% 0.083 157/62% 14/6% 84/33% 0.003 
Night time economy 52 17 9/17% 15/29% 28/54% 10/19% 30/58% 12/23% 27/52% 10/19% 15/29% 
Alcohol offence Yes 13 4 2/15% 4/31% 7/54% 0.423 1/8% 9/69% 3/23% 0.812 11/85% 0 2/15% 0.162 
No 294 96 86/29% 56/19% 152/52% 36/12% 2016/70% 52/18% 173/59% 24/8% 97/33% 
Violent offence Yes 18 6 5/29% 5/29% 8/44% 0.648 2/11% 13/72% 3/17% 0.978 13/72% 1/6% 4/22% 0.548 
No 289 94 83/29% 55/19% 151/52% 35/12% 202/70% 52/18% 171/59% 23/8% 95/33% 
Abuse offence Yes 49 16 8/16% 5/10% 36/74% 0.004 7/14% 28/57% 14/29% 0.070 27/55% 4/8% 18/37% 0.741 
No 258 84 80/31% 55/21% 123/48% 30/12% 187/73% 41/16% 157/61% 20/8% 81/31% 
Theft offence Yes 233 76 76/33% 36/16% 121/52% 0.001 22/9% 172/74% 39/17% 0.017 139/60% 17/7% 77/33% 0.763 
No 74 24 12/16% 24/32% 38/51% 15/20% 43/58% 16/22% 45/61% 7/10% 22/30% 
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Descriptive statistics show that mean age in years for those that continued to offend post-
exclusion across the sub-samples ranged from 28.0 to 35.6, showing some variation from the 
mean age for all offenders that ignored their exclusion and continued to offend (32.2). However, 
one way ANOVA tests confirmed there was not a significant difference in mean offender age for 
post-exclusion offence type (F(2, n=176)=0.904, p=0.407), offence location (F(2, n=176)=0.978, 
p=0.378), or offence trading hours (F(2, n=176)=0.206, p=0.806). When considering all those 
who continued to offend following receipt of an exclusion, a majority both repeated their 
offence type and committed other types of offences (77%). This behaviour was observed across 
all of the sub-samples, although chi-squared tests for independence indicated that there were not 
significant associations between the variables. 
A majority (66%) of those that continued to offend following an exclusion would commit 
further offences only at locations other than where they committed the offence that resulted in 
receiving a sanction. This behaviour was observed across all the sub-samples with the exception 
of alcohol offending. A chi-squared test for independence indicated a significant association 
(p=0.012) between whether or not the offence concerned theft and post-exclusion offence 
location, with 71% of those that were excluded for committing theft carrying out further 
offending only at other locations (compared to 51% for non-theft offending and 66% for all 
post-exclusion offending). 
A majority (53%) of those that continued to offend following an exclusion committed further 
offences within both trading time periods. Again, this behaviour was observed across all of the 
sub-samples, with the exception of alcohol offending. A chi-squared test for independence 
indicated a significant association (p<0.001) between the trading hour time period of the 
exclusion sanction offence and of the further offending. This is noteworthy as it means that 54% 
of those that received their exclusion for an offence committed during day time trading hours 
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and 81% during night time trading hours went on to commit offences during the opposing 
trading time period.
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Table E: Post-exclusion offender behaviour 
 
 
Variable 
Sample (n=206) Offence type Offence location Offence trading hours 
Sub-
sample 
% of total 
sample 
Repeated 
only 
Other 
only 
Repeated 
and other 
p-
value 
Repeated 
only 
Other 
only 
Repeated 
and other 
p-
value 
Repeated 
only 
Other 
only 
Repeated 
and other 
p-
value 
Full sample 206 100 25/12% 23/11% 158/77%  7/3% 136/66% 63/31%   85/41% 11/5% 110/53%   
Age (mean years) 176 85 31.5 35.6 31.7 0.407 28.0 33.0 30.9 0.378 31.6 33.8 32.5 0.806 
Sex Male 151 74 17/11% 19/13% 115/76% 0.503 6/4% 94/62% 51/34% 0.07 58/38% 10/7% 83/55% 0.248 
Female 54 26 8/15% 4/7% 42/78% 0 42/78% 12/22% 26/28% 1/2% 27/50% 
Trading hours  Day time economy 175 85 23/13% 18/10% 134/77% 0.411 6/3% 120/69% 49/28% 0.158 79/45% 4/2% 92/53% 0.000 
Night time economy 31 15 2/7% 5/16% 24/77% 1/3% 16/52% 14/45% 6/19% 7/23% 18/58% 
Alcohol offence Yes 9 4 0 1/11% 8/89% 0.516 1/11% 4/44% 4/44% 0.234 7/78% 0 2/22% 0.072 
No 197 96 25/13% 22/11% 150/76% 6/3% 132/67% 59/30% 78/40% 11/6% 108/55% 
Violent offence Yes 8 4 0 2/25% 6/75% 0.295 0 5/63% 3/38% 0.807 4/50% 0 4/50% 0.735 
No 198 96 25/13% 21/11% 152/77% 7/4% 131/66% 60/30% 81/41% 11/6% 106/54% 
Abuse offence Yes 40 19 1/3% 3/8% 36/90% 0.063 2/5% 21/53% 17/43% 0.132 17/43% 2/5% 21/53% 0.982 
No 166 81 24/15% 20/12% 122/74% 5/3% 115/69% 46/28% 68/41% 9/5% 89/54% 
Theft offence Yes 153 74 21/14% 13/9% 119/78% 0.077 3/2% 109/71% 41/27% 0.012 63/41% 8/5% 82/54% 0.990 
No 53 26 4/8% 10/19% 39/74% 4/8% 27/51% 22/42% 22/42% 3/6% 28/53% 
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Q3: Can offender/offence information recorded by the partnership be used to predict the 
occurrence of further offending following the receipt of (i) the warning or (ii) the 
exclusion sanction?.  
This question was included due to the benefits for partnerships that could arise from being able 
to identify individuals who were more likely to ignore sanctions, and from knowing when 
additional information sharing or protection measures might be valuable for members. Logistic 
regression was used to examine whether data could be used to predict offenders continuing to 
offend or not (dependent variable) following the receipt of the warning (test one) or the 
exclusion (test two). The predictor variables considered here were offender sex (coded as 
0=male, 1=female) and age, whether the offence took place during the day time (coded as ‘0’) or 
night time economy (coded as ‘1’) trading hours, and whether the offence concerned alcohol, 
violence, abuse or theft (in each instance coded as 0=no, 1=yes). For test one, concerning post-
warning behaviour, the full model was statistically significant, x2 (7, N=1303) = 36.168, p<0.001, 
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between people that did and did not continue to 
offend following the warning sanction. There was great variability in the behaviour of the 
offenders, however, and the Cox & Snell R Square (0.032) and Nagelkerke R Square (0.048) 
values indicated that less than 3% of the variability in the data is explained by this set of 
variables. Despite this, the model still correctly classified 75.8% of cases in the data. Sex 
(p<0.001) and Age (p<0.001) were found to be significant variables in the prediction of further 
offending. The B value of -0.668 indicates an increased likelihood of male offenders continuing 
to offend following their warning sanction. The Exp(B) value of 1.019 indicates an increase in 
the likelihood of desistance as the offender’s age increases. The trading hours during which the 
offence was committed, and whether the offence concerned alcohol, violence, abuse or theft all 
did not appear to be significant predictors of whether an offender would continue to offend 
following the receipt of a warning sanction. These findings are illustrated in Table F. 
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Table F: Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of further offender following warning 
sanction 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Sex -.668 .157 18.177 1 .000 .513 .377 .697 
Age .019 .005 13.292 1 .000 1.019 1.009 1.029 
Trading hours  0.24 .272 .008 1 .929 1.024 .601 1.747 
Alcohol offence -.119 .376 .100 1 .752 .888 .425 1.854 
Violent offence -.276 .324 .724 1 .395 .759 .402 1.433 
Abuse offence .461 .255 3.268 1 .071 1.585 .962 2.612 
Theft offence .103 .282 .133 1 .715 1.108 .637 1.928 
 
For test two, concerning post-exclusion behaviour, the full model was not statistically significant, 
x2 (7, N=329) = 12.981, p=0.073, indicating that the model was not able to distinguish between 
people that did and did not continue to offend following receipt of the exclusion sanction.  
Discussion and conclusion 
The findings presented here suggest that this place-based sanction system can be a useful tool for 
tackling specific types of crime and disorder. The analysis offers valuable insight into the 
behaviour of offenders following the receipt of these sanctions, an area where there is currently 
little available evidence (Farmer et al., 2018; Søgaard, 2018). With 76% of offenders committing 
no further offences following the receipt of the warning sanction, this aspect of the approach 
can be recognised as successful. This finding lends itself to arguments concerning deterrence 
theory, that it is the perceived likelihood of being caught in future, in this instance heightened 
through the information sharing process that follows the issue of a warning sanction, that is the 
most significant deterrent from committing a crime (Apel and Nagin, 2011; Apel, 2013). 
However, it is also conceivable that individuals in this group could have been less likely to offend 
again for other reasons and that the sanction itself was not an influencing factor within their 
decision to desist.  
The effectiveness of the place-based exclusion was not as extensive in this instance as the 
widespread use of this approach might suggest. For those that continued to offend post-
exclusion in particular, the deterring effect of the sanction, its support at point of issue from the 
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police and its collective enforcement appeared to have somewhat limited effects on their 
offending activity. Roughly half (49%) of those that received an exclusion for an offence 
committed during the night time economy trading hours, an alcohol offence (47%) or a violent 
offence (58%) committed no further offences, as opposed to 37% for the sample as a whole 
(37%), 
There was noteworthy variation in offender behaviour according to sex and age. Following 
receipt of the warning sanction, 83% of females committed no further offences compared to 
72% of males, echoing findings in Graham and Bowling (1995) and Flood-Page et al. (2000) and 
supporting their arguments concerning the variation in processes leading to desistance for males 
and females. Although the mean ages for those that desisted from offending post-sanction were 
lower than for those that continued to offend post-sanction by 3.3 years following the warning 
and 1.5 years following the exclusion, in line with arguments in Laub and Sampson (2001) and 
Warr (2006), logistic regression revealed that rates of desistance appeared to increase with age 
across the sample as a whole, also echoing claims that shoplifting is more prevalent among 
adolescent populations (Hayes and Blackwood 2006; Hunter et al. 2018). 
The findings offer unique insight into the displacement of offending and into the behaviour of 
those that continue to offend post-sanction. A large majority (70% following warning and 66% 
following exclusion) would commit further offences only at locations other than where they 
committed the offence that resulted in them receiving a warning sanction. Higher levels of such 
behaviour were observed among those that received a sanction for theft (74% post warning and 
71% post-exclusion). Although the sanction system may well be hardening the target of the 
premises where the sanction was issued (in line with Tilley, 2002), this level of displacement 
between member premises is a noteworthy limitation of the approach and highlights the likely 
fact that making offenders aware of which businesses are involved in the partnership and making 
this visible to offenders at premise entry points does not appear to be deterring certain 
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individuals. A majority of those that continued to offend post-sanction would both continue to 
commit the type of offence for which they received their sanction and commit other types of 
offences (52% post-warning and 77% post-exclusion). It was rarer for a continuing offender to 
only commit one type of offence, and those who committed larger numbers of offences showed 
the greatest variation in offence type and time of day of their offending. Because of this 
variation, it was not possible to identify predictor variables through logistic regression for those 
that commit the greatest volume of offences.  
These findings have specific implications for crime reduction partnerships employing a place-
based exclusion sanction system. The high level of displacement observed here supports the calls 
made elsewhere for effective information sharing between those involved in a partnership 
(Bamfield 2018; Gill 2018). Members are unlikely to be aware of the risks posed by individual 
offenders (and to subsequently take measures to protect themselves) without data sharing 
platforms and procedures in place granting them timely access to this information. Moreover, for 
business communities to understand fully the offending behaviour of individual offenders and 
the great diversity in offence type and time of day at which they offend, BCRPs need to collect 
information on multiple types of offences and bring together business that operate during the 
day time and night time economy trading periods to share their collective knowledge and 
experience. In line with arguments in Stafford and Hobson (2018), the findings presented in this 
article highlight the value of broad, multi-sector BCRPs that include businesses from every 
commercial sector and that trade during any time period, and that seek to tackle and share 
information on all types of crime and disorder to which their members can be exposed. 
However, even when employing this approach, the BCRP examined here is still experiencing 
limited success in some regards. Considering this issue through the lens of Rational Choice 
Theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986), it is clear that there is wide variation in individual offender 
assessment of effort, risk and reward. The exclusion sanction employed here is a significant 
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deterrent for most, but it is given little or no heed by others. Prolific offenders that ignore their 
sanctions and continue to offend are causing this partnership and its members significant 
problems.  The logistic regression analysis included in this paper illustrates how the chaotic and 
varied offending of this group makes accurate predictions about their behaviour difficult to 
arrive at (using this data, at least). Moreover, this variation means that partnerships may struggle 
to identify tailored, factor-specific strategies for tackling such offending. 
This study has been affected by several factors that remain problematic for researchers in this 
field. As with all information on crime, the partnership’s data only contains the offences that it 
recorded. Other offences will have occurred that were not reported or that were not recorded by 
the BCRP’s manager following a judgement on their severity or suitability. There is also no 
available information on offences that occur at non-BCRP member locations within the 
partnership’s area of concern, or at other nearby locations. As a result, this study has been unable 
to offer insight into offending displacement beyond the BCRP member locations, or into 
whether those who had no further offences recorded against them following receipt of a 
sanction desisted from all further offending or simply desisted from offending against those 
involved in the BCRP.  
Other limitations arise from the approach employed here and the data that was used. The 
decision to focus on the more prevalent crime types, and on the crime types to which place-
based exclusion sanctions have been used most commonly in response to, may have resulted in 
factors associated with other crime types being overlooked. There were also a number of 
offenders who were never issued with a sanction as their identify was unknown, meaning that 
their behaviour post-sanction could not always be observed. Another limitation of this study is 
that it draws solely upon the data collected by one partnership in one area and therefore cannot 
be regarded as representative of other locations or place-based banning sanctions. Finally, the 
predictive potential of the regression analysis conducted in response to the third research 
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question was somewhat limited. Further data on offender behaviour post-sanction is required for 
significant predictions to be made concerning this. 
Although noteworthy, these limitations do not negate the value of this study’s contribution to 
the literature. The insight into the design, operation, benefits and limitations of the warning and 
exclusion system used by this BCRP and into the behaviour of individuals post-sanction 
presented here will be of interest to those involved in crime reduction partnerships and in other 
collectives or organisations that employ similar mechanisms, as well as to researchers examining 
these issues. The activity and operation of such partnerships and the offending that they are 
subject to remain relatively under-researched topics, however, and there is great need for further 
study of the various crime reduction practices employed in this domain to ensure that 
partnerships can draw upon research evidence when conducting their activity. 
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